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PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Pursuant to Rule 76(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
defendants and appellants petition the court for rehearing of 
this case and for modification of its decision herein filed June 
18, 1976 to grant appellants1 request for a new trial. 
REASONS FOR THIS PETITION 
The majority decision (written by Justice Tuckett and 
concurred in by Justice Crockett and Justice Maughan) turned on 
an issue not raised or argued in either appellants1 or respond-
ents1 briefs previously submitted. Accordingly, counsel for the 
parties have not had adequate opportunity to advise the court of 
their cases and arguments on the issue selected by the court as 
the basis for its decision. 
The issue on which the majority opinion turned was whether 
appellants made timely objection to failure by the court to give 
its requested instruction No. 19 advising the jury that plaintiff 
could not recover if she was contributorily negligent. 
Both the majority decision and the dissenting opinion 
(written by Justice Ellett and concurred in by Justice Henroid) 
concluded that the requested jury instruction No. 19 should have 
been given but was not given. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts of this case are the same as set forth in the 
brief of defendants-appellants previously filed in this case. 
The essential sequence of events relevant to the issued raised 
in this petition are: 
1. The subject auto-pedestrian accident occurred on 
January 13, 1973 (before Utah's comparative negligence statute 
was enacted) and was tried in September, 1975 (after the 
comparative negligence statute became law). 
2. The trial judge told counsel he was giving defend-
ants1 requested jury instruction No. 19 "in substance" and so 
noted thereon. (R-92). However, the court failed to give that 
portion of the instruction stating "One who is guilty of 
contributory negligence may not recover from another for any 
injury suffered. . ." 
3. While in chambers, counsel for the parties, with 
approval by the court, agreed to reserve their exceptions to 
the jury instructions for dictation to the court reporter at a 
later time. This stipulation was entered into the court 
record. (R-167). 
4. When the court read its instructions to the jury, 
counsel for the parties had not been furnished a correlated 
copy of the jury instructions. The only such copy in exis-
tence was taken by the jury into the jury room. (Supplemental 
TR-25, 29, 30). 
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5. From notes made by counsel in the trial judge's 
chambers at the time the jury instructions were discussed, 
counsel for the parties dictated to the court reporter, in the 
absence of the judge, their initial exceptions to the jury 
instructions. 
6. After the jury had returned its verdict and was dis-
charged, defendants1 counsel first became aware that the 
essential portion of its instruction No. 19 had not in fact 
been given, contrary to the court's representation. At a 
subsequent hearing, the court expressed concern over its 
negligence in failing to give the instruction No. 19. After 
hesitantly concluding that the instructions given were ade-
quate, the court granted defendants' permission to supplment 
their objections so that the issue of sufficiency of the 
instructions could be determined on appeal. (Supplemental TR 
28-30). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANTS 
FAILED TO TAKE TIMELY EXCEPTIONS TO THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FAILURE TO GIVE THEIR REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 19. 
The majority decision of the Supreme Court of Utah found 
that defendants' requested jury instruction No. 19 was a 
proper one. However, it held that defendants failed to timely 
Q 
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except to the courtfs failure to give the requested instruc-
tion as required by Rule 51, U.R.C.P., the pertinent part of 
which is as follows: 
. . . If the instructions are to be given in writing, 
all objections thereto must be made before the instruc-
tions are given to the jury; otherwise, objections may be 
made to the instructions after they are given to the 
jury, but before the jury retires to consider its ver-
dict. No party may assign as error the giving or the 
failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto. 
In objecting to the giving of an instruction, a party 
must state distinctly the matter to which he objects and 
the grounds for his objection. Notwithstanding the 
foregoing requirement, the Appellate Court, in its 
discretion and in the interest of justice, may review the 
giving or failure to give an instruction. 
The court has previously taken judicial notice of the 
prevailing customary practice in Utah for counsel, with approval 
of the trial court, to reserve exceptions to jury instructions 
for dictation to the court reporter at a later time, usually 
when the trial judge is not even present. See State of Utah 
v. Cowan, 26 Utah 2d. 410, 490 P.2d 890. Even though the 
court notes that the common practice seems ill advised because 
it gives the court and opposing counsel no opportunity to 
correct errors or omissions which may be pointed out, no case 
law has been found indicating that the provisions of Rule 51 
may not be abrogated by such stipulation of counsel with 
approval of the court. Nor has this court ever previously 
failed to consider on appeal an objection to jury instructions 
duly entered into the record after the jury has retired, when 
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done according to such stipulation and even though contrary to 
Rule 51. 
A Utah case apparently not considered by the court in its 
decision, but which is clearly applicable here, is Hanks v. 
Christensen, 11 Utah 2d 8, 354 P.2d 564 (1960). In that case, 
plaintiff complained that the trial court did not permit him 
to make objections to instructions before giving them to the 
jury, and that it failed, before instructing the jury, to 
inform him of its rulings on his objections and request for 
instructions. Although the court held that the jury instruc-
tions as given in that case were adequate, the analysis set 
forth in the unanimous decision of the court authored by 
Justice Crockett is directly applicable to this case. The 
court stated in pertinent part: 
It must be conceded that the parties have a right to 
make objections to the instructions to preserve chal-
lenges to their accuracy. Rule 51. But Rule 46 pro-
vides : 
"* * *±f
 a party has no opportunity to object to a 
ruling or order at the time it is made, the absence of an 
objection does not thereafter prejudice him.11 
Under such rule, if counsel was prevented from 
making objections, he should be deemed to have done so. 
The vital question is not when or how the objections 
are allowed to be made, but whether the instructions are 
correct. What the party is entitled to is a presentation 
of the case to the jury under instructions that clearly, 
concisely and accurately state the issues and the law 
applicable thereto so that the jury will understand its 
duties. Unless the procedure followed would militate 
against accomplishing that purpose by causing proper 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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instructions to be omitted or improper ones to be given, 
there would be no prejudicial error and the mechanics of 
the procedure would not be of controlling importance. 
What has just been said likewise applies to the 
claim that counsel was not furnished a copy of the 
court's instructions until they were being read to the 
jury. The furnishing of a copy of the instructions to 
counsel is a convenience and courtesy to hime It lets 
him know the theory upon which the court has presented 
the case so he can formulate his argument; and facili-
tates the taking of any necessary exceptions. This 
courtesy should be extended at the earliest convenience 
of the court. There may have been some delay, but it 
appears that counsel did get his copy during the time the 
instructions were being given and that he used the same 
in taking his exceptions. 
The clear implication of the Hanks decision is that if 
the mechanics of the procedure, such as failure to furnish 
counsel with a copy of the court's instructions when they are 
read to the jury, militates against causing proper instruc-
tions to be omitted or improper ones to be given, then under 
Rule 46 the objecting party will not be prejudiced for any 
failure to timely object to an instruction. 
Rule 46, U.R.C.P. states: 
Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the court 
...-...' are unnecessary. It is sufficient that a party, at the 
time the ruling or order of the court is made or sought, 
makes known to the court the action which he desires the 
court to take or his objection to the action of the court 
and his grounds therefor; and, if a party has no oppor-
tunity to object to a ruling or order at the time it is 
made, the absence of an objection does not thereafter 
prejudice him. 
The circumstances in the instant case clearly show that 
defendants did not have fair opportunity to object to the 
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court's instructions at the time they were made, as set forth 
in the following excerpt from Justice Ellett's dissenting 
opinion as follows: 
In the first place, the trial judge told counsel for 
defendant that he would give the instruction in question. 
In the second place, in order to hasten the end of the 
case, the court on stipulation of counsel, agreed to 
permit exceptions to be taken after the jury retired. In 
the third place, there was only one set of instructions 
read to the jury and that set was given to the jury, and 
consequently was not available for inspection by counsel. 
It seems rather obvious that it would be difficult 
for counsel, listening to the reading of a long set of 
instructions to recall just what was given, and this 
would especially be true where the judge had lulled 
counsel into a feeling of security by promising to give 
the substance of a particular instruction. 
As soon as the verdict was rendered, the judge dis-
charged the jury before counsel had access to the set of 
instructions which had been given to the jury. 
In accordance with the procedure adopted by the trial 
court, with the stipulation of counsel, that the requirements 
of Rule 51 be waived, and in accordance with Rule 46 U.R.C.P, 
and the principles set forth in Hanks v. Christensen, supra, 
the court should not deny defendants a new trial where a jury 
instruction of crucial importance was not given in substance 
even though the court had told counsel that it was included in 
stock instructions being given. 
POINT II 
IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
SHOULD HAVE EXERCISED ITS DISCRETIONARY POWER UNDER RULE 
51 TO GRANT DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
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After setting forth the customary procedure for objecting 
to written jury instructions, Rule 51, U.R.C.P. states: 
. . .Notwithstanding the foregoing requirement, the 
appellate court, in its discretion and in the interest of 
justice, may review the giving or failure to give an 
instruction. 
Although exercising the powers under this clause should 
be the exception and not the rule, the Supreme Court of Utah 
has said in McCall v. Kendrick, 2 Utah 2d 364, 274 P.2d 962 
(1954), that it is properly invoked to "extricate a person 
from a situation where some gross injustice or inequity would 
otherwise result." 
If it is the purpose of the court by this case to effect 
a change in the long-standing and widely followed practice of 
permitting counsel to reserve exceptions to jury instructions, 
then such a broad change of customary procedure can best be 
accomplished, without exemplary injustice to the defendants 
herein, by the court invoking its discretionary power under 
Rule 51 and serving the trial court and members of the bar 
with notice that hereafter the requirements of Rule 51 will be 
strictly applied. Otherwise, these defendants become a sac-
rificial lamb to a custom and practice which these defendants 
did not institute. If the custom of reserving exceptions to 
jury instructions is to be the subject of reform, then it should 
be accomplished without personal penalty to these defendants. 
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CONCLUSION 
By premising its decision on the technical procedural 
issue of timely objection, this court has failed to meet the 
issue intended by the trial court and by counsel for decision 
here, namely, whether the instructions to the jury were de-
fective in failing to tell them that contributory negligence 
should bar recovery by the plaintiffs. 
Strict compliance with Rule 51 should not be required in 
this case because (a) it was waived by stipulation of counsel 
with approval by the court, (b) prevailing circumstances qual-
ify for waiver of objection under Rule 46 and earlier decisions 
of this court, and (c) in the interests of justice the court 
should invoke its discretion under Rule 51 to review the jury 
instructions notwithstanding any failure of technical compliance, 
Respectfully submitted, 
POELMAN, FOX, /EDWARDS &^SWALD 
By / / , f^-^Lto -n # «TT"\ ^/O—1-^CA~*~**-AA+*~ 
LLOYD POELMAN 
36 South State Street 
Suite 2000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Served two (2) copies of the foregoing 
Petition for Rehearing by delivering 
them to E. H. Fankhauser at 430 Judge 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
7th day of July, 1976. 
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